blank.gif (43 bytes)

Church Of The
Swimming Elephant

Search:
2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity

Up: Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
Up: Requests For Comments
Up: RFC 2065
Up: 2. Overview of the DNS Extensions
Prev: 2.2 Key Distribution
Next: 2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record

2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity

2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity

Authentication is provided by associating with resource records in the DNS cryptographically generated digital signatures. Commonly, there will be a single private key that signs for an entire zone. If a security aware resolver reliably learns the public key of the zone, it can verify, for signed data read from that zone, that it was properly authorized and is reasonably current. The expected implementation is for the zone private key to be kept off-line and used to re-sign all of the records in the zone periodically.

This data origin authentication key belongs to the zone and not to the servers that store copies of the data. That means compromise of a server or even all servers for a zone will not necessarily affect the degree of assurance that a resolver has that it can determine whether data is genuine.

A resolver can learn the public key of a zone either by reading it from DNS or by having it staticly configured. To reliably learn the public key by reading it from DNS, the key itself must be signed. Thus, to provide a reasonable degree of security, the resolver must be configured with at least the public key of one zone that it can use to authenticate signatures. From there, it can securely read the public keys of other zones, if the intervening zones in the DNS tree are secure and their signed keys accessible. (It is in principle more secure to have the resolver manually configured with the public keys of multiple zones, since then the compromise of a single zone would not permit the faking of information from other zones. It is also more administratively cumbersome, however, particularly when public keys change.)

Adding data origin authentication and integrity requires no change to the "on-the-wire" DNS protocol beyond the addition of the signature resource type and, as a practical matter, the key resource type needed for key distribution. This service can be supported by existing resolver and server implementations so long as they can support the additional resource types (see Section 8). The one exception is that CNAME referrals from a secure zone can not be authenticated if they are from non-security aware servers (see Section 2.3.5).

If signatures are always separately retrieved and verified when retrieving the information they authenticate, there will be more trips to the server and performance will suffer. To avoid this, security aware servers mitigate that degradation by always attempting to send the signature(s) needed.


Next: 2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record

Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity

Cotse.Net

Protect yourself from cyberstalkers, identity thieves, and those who would snoop on you.
Stop spam from invading your inbox without losing the mail you want. We give you more control over your e-mail than any other service.
Block popups, ads, and malicious scripts while you surf the net through our anonymous proxies.
Participate in Usenet, host your web files, easily send anonymous messages, and more, much more.
All private, all encrypted, all secure, all in an easy to use service, and all for only $5.95 a month!

Service Details

 
.
www.cotse.com
Have you gone to church today?
.
All pages ©1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Church of the Swimming Elephant unless otherwise stated
Church of the Swimming Elephant©1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Cotse.com.
Cotse.com is a wholly owned subsidiary of Packetderm, LLC.

Packetderm, LLC
210 Park Ave #308
Worcester, MA 01609