7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
Up:
Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
Up:
Requests For Comments
Up:
RFC 1812
Up:
7. APPLICATION LAYER - ROUTING PROTOCOLS
Up:
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Prev: 7.1 INTRODUCTION
Next: 7.1.2 Precedence
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
Routing is one of the few places where the Robustness Principle (be
liberal in what you accept) does not apply. Routers should be
relatively suspicious in accepting routing data from other routing
systems.
A router SHOULD provide the ability to rank routing information
sources from most trustworthy to least trustworthy and to accept
routing information about any particular destination from the most
trustworthy sources first. This was implicit in the original
core/stub autonomous system routing model using EGP and various
interior routing protocols. It is even more important with the
demise of a central, trusted core.
A router SHOULD provide a mechanism to filter out obviously invalid
routes (such as those for net 127).
Routers MUST NOT by default redistribute routing data they do not
themselves use, trust or otherwise consider valid. In rare cases, it
may be necessary to redistribute suspicious information, but this
should only happen under direct intercession by some human agency.
Routers must be at least a little paranoid about accepting routing
data from anyone, and must be especially careful when they distribute
routing information provided to them by another party. See below for
specific guidelines.
Next: 7.1.2 Precedence
Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
|